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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1959 TENNESSEE SURVEY
ELVIN E. OVERTON*
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

II. CIVIL LIBERTIES
Ill. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
IV. EcoNoIVnc REGULATION
V. ADMVINISTRATIVE LAW
VI. GOVERNMENTAL LAW
VII. CONCLUSION

A smaller number of cases have been selected for inclusion in this
year's survey. Seven cases are included, including one federal court
decision dealing with a municipal ordinance. In addition, two specific
acts of the General Assembly are noted although there has as yet
been no opportunity for the courts to rule upon them.
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The only case requiring mention here, Werner v. City of Knoxville,'
struck down a Knoxville ordinance setting up a board of review with
power to ban publications which
prominently features an account of crime, or is obscene, or depicts, by the
use of drawings or photographs or printed words, obscene actions and
accounts, or the commission or attempted commission of the crimes of
arson, assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, kidnapping, mayhem,
murder, rape, robbery, theft or voluntary manslaughter. 2

The district court held that the statute was too broad, since it
described printed matter not sufficiently evil to be prohibited. In
addition, the statute was too uncertain to meet the test of procedural
due process because it did not make explicit what acts would be
punished, nor did it provide any guides or standards for the board
of review, despite the broad censorship powers granted. The decision seems entirely justified by the leading United States Supreme
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee.
1. 161 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Tenn. 1958). The case is dealt with more fully in
the subsection of this survey, "Civil Liberties," since it raises essentially a
freedom of speech problem.
2. KNoxviLLE, TENN., CODE Ch. 30, § 49 (1945), as amended, Ordinance 2077,
§ (e).
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Court cases, including Winters v. New York 3 which was relied upon
heavily in the opinion.
The problem of judicial jurisdiction is properly thought of as involving questions of procedural due process. An enactment of the
81st General Assembly broadens the basis of judicial power and revives interest in older Tennessee decisions. The most recent enactment is itself very brief. Chapter 110 of the Public Acts of 1959,
amends section 20-223 of the Tennessee Code Annotated by inserting
in the first sentence thereof, immediately after the words "whether
resident or non-resident," the words "including non-resident partnerships."
Section 20-223 is basically a 1957 act and provides that unincorporated associations and organizations, whether resident or nonresident, now including nonresident partnerships, doing or desiring to
do business in this state by performing any of the acts for which it
was formed, shall, before any such acts are performed, appoint an
agent upon whom process may be served. Upon failure to appoint
such an agent, service may be upon the Secretary of State. The section further provides that judgments recovered through this process
may be collected out of any real or personal property belonging
to the association or organization. The statute apparently does not
attempt to impose personal liability upon the members of the association or organization, but would supposedly have to be satisfied out
of the assets of the association.5
The statute is clearly constitutional, under the United States Constitution. The original statute was sustained by the Tennessee Court
of Appeals in 1952.6 Judge McAmis' opinion recognized that Henry
L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman7 permits judicial jurisdiction to be
exercised against individuals who transact business through agents
in a state and that Flexner v. Farson8 has been overruled or at least is
distinguishable on the ground that the agent had ceased to be an
agent when served. 9 Thus, the court of appeals, in substance, found
3. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-223 (Supp. 1959), amending TENN. CODE ANN. §
20-223 (1956).
5. The distinction between collecting out of the partnership assets and
the individual member's assets is well established. Thus, a judgment against
a partnership only in a state which treats a partnership as an entity may
be collected out of the firm assets in a state which treats a partnership as
an aggregate; but it could not be collected out of individual assets of a
partner who was not individually subject to the jurisdiction of the court
giving the judgment. East Denver Municipal Irr. Dist. v. Doherty, 293 Fed. 804
(S.D.N.Y. 1923); Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 ,(1889).

6. McDaniel v. Textile Union, 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d 1 (1952).
7. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
8. 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
9. McDaniel v. Textile Union, 36 Tenn. App. 236, 245, 254 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1952).
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that two older Tennessee cases, 10 which had followed Flexner v.
Farson, were not controlling. Since the two older Tennessee cases
held that the statute" authorizing service upon the agent of an
individual was unconstitutional as applied to a nonresident, the constitutionality of the statute authorizing service upon the agent of a
nonresident individual is now in doubt.
The United States Supreme Court decisions, 12 and the decision in the
McDaniel' 3 case, clearly would sustain a statute authorizing service
upon the agent of a nonresident individual, limited of course to causes
of action arising out of the doing of the business. As pointed out
above, however, the statute has been held unconstitutional by the
state supreme court; perhaps it should be re-enacted by the legislature
if it is to have vitality. The 1959 act makes it clear that nonresident
partnerships are subjected to the jurisdiction of Tennessee courts if
they engage in business in Tennessee. It would be helpful if it were
equally clear whether nonresident individuals subject themselves to
the jurisdiction of Tennessee courts by doing business in Tennessee.
II. CivL LIBERTIES

In one sense of the term "civil liberties," all liberties which apply
to protect the individual from unconstitutional infringement are included. However, the term is normally used rather narrowly to
exclude such questions as the validity of restrictions applying to an
individual in the field of business and economic regulation.
The principal case dealing with civil liberty in this narrower
connotation decided during the period covered by the survey is
Werner v. City of Knoxville,14 previously mentioned as involving
procedural due process. 15 The case is primarily a case of freedom of
speech and censorship. The Knoxville ordinance 16 set up a board of
review to ban various publications which were deemed injurious to
public morals and likely to incite crime. In addition to holding the
ordinance invalid because it was too uncertain and gave the board
powers of censorship without guides or standards, the district court
held that the ordinance was too broad and would have authorized
the board to eliminate from bookstores and libraries many wholesome
10. Frolich v. Hanson, 155 Tenn. 601, 296 S.W. 353 (1927); Knox Bros. v. E.
W. Wagner & Co., 141 Tenn. 348, 209 S.W. 638 (1918). Residence is under
these cases recognized as a basis of judicial jurisdiction in the case of

an individual engaged in business in Tennessee through an agent.
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-218 (1956).
12. See Overton, Broadening the Bases of Individual In Personam Jurisdiction in Tennessee, 22 TENx. L. REV. 237 (1952).
13. Note 6 supra.
14. 161 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Tenn. 1958).
15. Note 2 supra.
16. Note 4 supra.
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books and publications. This seems entirely correct under United
17
States Supreme Court decisions.
18
In Burton v. Jones the Tennessee Supreme Court simply stated
that there could be no imprisonment for civil debt. The Tennessee
Constitution provides in article 1, section 18, that "The legislature
shall pass no law authorizing imprisonment for debt in civil cases."
The lower court had cited the petitioner for contempt of court. The
petitioner had consented to a judgment against him for $5000, and
shortly thereafter filed a petition in bankruptcy. The lower court had
apparently deemed this to be a fraud on the court since it found that
he had intended to do this when he consented to the judgment. The
supreme court said that this was civil contempt since the purpose
of the court in confining the petitioner was to enforce the private
right. Since the lower court had originally confined the petitioner to
jail until he purged himself of contempt by making up back payments
as provided in the consent decree and later changed it to a criminal
contempt sentence of ten days in jail and a $50 fine, the supreme court
reasoned that he was being imprisoned for failure to pay the judgment
rather than for any fraud upon the court.
One could reasonably argue that confessing a judgment, or consenting to an adverse judgment with the intention of going into bankruptcy, is simply not contempt of court. This is not the situation
where one creates a debt, intending at the time to go into bankruptcy.
Confessing judgment is not the procuring of something additional
from the claimant, as is the creation of a new indebtedness. Since
the existing debt could be discharged as completely without being
reduced to judgment as it could after being reduced to judgment, it
is difficult to see why confessing judgment with knowledge of impending bankruptcy is contempt of court.
An enactment of the 81st General Assembly, replacing the old
sedition statute,19 has not yet been tested in the court, but it raises
some important questions in several ways. The new section provides:
Whoever knowingly or wilfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the State of Tennessee or of the United States by
17. The opinion relied heavily upon Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957) which sustained statutes proscribing obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
and indecent material.
18. 322 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1959).
19. The former section punished "seditious words or speeches, spreading
abroad false news," "scurrilous libels against the state or general government," "obstructing any lawful officer," "instigating others to cabal or meet
together to contrive, invent, suggest, or incite rebellious conspiracies, riots,
or any manner of unlawful feuds or differences, thereby to stir people up
maliciously to contrive the ruin and destruction of the peace, safety, and
order of the government." TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-4405 (1956).
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force, or violence, or by the assassination of any officers of either government, or whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction
of the government of Tennessee or of the United States, prints, publishes,
edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes or publicly displays any written
or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing the government of Tennessee
or of the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so, or
whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group,
or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow
or destruction of the government of Tennessee or of the United States by
force or violence, or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any
such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purpose thereof,
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or imprisoned
not more than ten (10) years in the State Penitentiary, or both, and
shall be ineligible for employment by the State of Tennessee or any department or agency thereof, for the five (5) years following his conviction.20
The obvious constitutional law question arises as to whether this
section violates the constitutional principles relating to freedom of
speech and association. Since the statute requires knowledge of the
propensities of the group or association, it avoids the evils of some
legislation which has punished for membership without requiring
"scienter."21 The emphasis on force and violence is intended of course
to make the act more clearly constitutional. But it is at least questionable whether the act is sufficiently narrow to withstand a constitutional attack.22 Teaching and advocacy may not have the immediacy
required for whatever substitute for the clear and present danger is
currently in use. 3 Of course membership in the Communist party
is more definite to the extent that the courts are recognizing that the
Communist party is more than an advocate of communistic theory
of government and that, in fact, its organizers intend the overthrow
of the government as speedily as circumstances shall permit. 24
20. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-4405 (Supp. 1959).
21. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) struck down an Oklahoma
loyalty oath on the ground that it did not provide for scienter in an oath
that the affiant had never been a member of a communist group or a group
listed on the subversive list of the Attorney General.
However, an oath that the official did not advocate overthrow of the government by force and that they did not belong to organizations which did was
sustained when scienter was implied. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341
U.S. 716 (1951).
22. It will be remembered that the noncommunist oath required of labor
leaders was at least partly hung upon the peculiar control Congress had over
interstate commerce. American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950). Three justices did not participate. In Osman v. Douds, 339
U.S. 846 (1950), the Court was equally divided and Justice Clark took no
part. Of course, oaths may be different from punishment for acts.
23. Chief Justice Vinson attempted to distinguish between conduct and
speech in the noncommunistic oath case with respect to the clear and present
danger problem. American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, supra
note 22.
24. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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To the extent that the statute punishes mere teaching or advising
the desirability and propriety of overthrowing a government by force,
if lawful means are no longer available, or prove effective, or is so
construed by a state court, it is believed that it interferes with
freedom of speech, and to the extent that it punishes persons who
organize a group to so teach and advise, it violates the right to association.
It may be noted in passing that uider English law the American
Revolutionists were traitors, and that the Tennessee Constitution
appears to exhort the maintenance of the revolutionary spirit and
temper.2
The act under discussion also raises serious constitutional issues
under the next subheading.
III. INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIONS

The problem of constitutional law dealing with the questions of
what areas are open to the states, after Congress has entered the field,
is part of the large question of what powers should be exercised by
the individual states. There were no Tennessee cases during the
period covered by this survey, but the enactment by the 81st General
Assembly of the act just discussed2 is clearly invalid, at least partially, unless Congress should act.
In the now famous Nelson27 case, the Court, in accord with a similar
previous decision,2 affirmed the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 9 in
holding that the Pennsylvania Sedition Act was superseded by the
Smith Act. Therefore, so far as the Tennessee act punishes sedition
and subversion directed toward the United States, as distinguished
from acts directed against Tennessee, it seems clearly to be superseded by the federal legislation.
Congress has taken cognizance of the decision though the earlier
decision was disregarded and received little attention. In the current
session of the Congress, various bills have been introduced and action
has been taken on one or two,30 but no final action has yet been
taken on any of them.
25. Article 1, Section 2, of the Tennessee constitution states that government
being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of nonresistance against
arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good
and happiness of mankind.
26. Note 21 supra.
27. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), rehearing denied, 351 U.S.
934 (1956).
28. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) held that title three of the Act
of Congress of June 28, 1940, known as the "Alien Registration Act of 1940"
superceded the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act of 1939.
29. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954) held that
title one of the same congressional act, known as the "Smith Act," superceded
the Pennsylvania Sedition Act of 1939.
30. H.R. 3, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959) was passed by the House without
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IV. EcoNomic REGULATION
Included in this subheading is the single largest group of cases included in the survey. Sometimes the cases involve primarily due
process and sometimes they turn on equal protection. Three cases
out of the seven included in the survey fall directly in this field.
Livesay v. Tennessee Bd. of Examiners in Watchmaking3l is possibly
one of the most provocative cases in the survey. The holding is very
simply that the Tennessee statute 2 regulating the watch repairing
business is unconstitutional.
The portions of the act dealt with in the case established a board
of examiners with authority to set up standards of education, training,
and experience which the board deems necessary to protect the public
from incompetent and fraudulent watchmakers, and in addition require specifically that a license applicant be of good moral character
and eighteen years of age. The basis of the decision was, rather
bluntly, that the watchmaking business cannot be regulated. The
court cited decisions from other states holding that their regulations
were invalid.3 3 It also cited a North Carolina case holding unconstitutional a regulation of photography on the ground that photography
was no more regulatable than the occupation of repairing of watches4
and a Tennessee case 35 holding a regulation of photography unconstitutional.
Once again, the result is not particularly objectionable, though it
would have been somewhat more convincing if the court had held that
the board was not given sufficient guiding standards or that there
was unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.3 A more
acceptable rationale of the problem would have been the balancing of
the fundamental right to engage in work of one's choosing against the
fundamental power of the state to protect its citizens in those areas
37
in which incompetence and fraud injure the community.
The grounding of the opinion seems unfortunate. The opinion states
that regulations of the watch repair business are unconstitutional
because watch repairing for money is an "inherent" property right,
amendment on June 24, 1959 and sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee
June 25, 1959. H.R. 2368, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959) was reported without
amendment on June 3, 1959. These two bills were designed primarily to
overcome or modify the effects of the Nelson decision. Their exact scope is not
known to the writer.
31. 322 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1959).
32. TENN. CODE AxN. §§ 62-1401 to -1410 (1955).
33. State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 207 Okl. 193, 248 P.2d 615 (1952). For
other cases, see Livesay v. Tennessee Bd. of Examiners in Watchmaking,
supra note 31, at 212.
34. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
35. Wright v. Wiles, 173 Tenn. 334, 117 S.W.2d 736 (1938).
36. This was the basis in State v. Morrow, 231 La. 572, 92 So. 2d 70 (1956).
37. Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1326 (1954).
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that incompetency and fraud on the part of watchmakers do not affect
the public but merely the parties to the transaction, and that if watchmakers can be regulated, then the legislature could regulate every
conceivable business free from constitutional restraint. The inference
is that regulations of a business, intended to protect the public from
fraud and dishonesty, no matter what the regulations are, do not have
any "substantial" or "real" tendency to protect the public. This inference is, of course, not valid, and undoubtedly the court did not
intend the opinion to be so construed.
The statute was attacked under the due process clause and under
article 1, section 8, and article 11, section 8,3 of the Tennessee constitution. The opinion does not squarely base itself upon any particular section of the Tennessee constitution, but the headnotes do refer
to the two sections. Certainly the mere regulation of watchmaking
would not, under the United States Supreme Court decisions, violate
the due process clause of the federal constitution. 39
Even "inherent property rights" are subject to some reasonable
regulation. Also a finding that a particular regulation is reasonable
and valid does not, of necessity, immunize all other regulations from
any requirement of reasonableness. A decision founded upon a factual
conclusion that the dangers from fraud and incompetence were not
currently sufficiently serious to allow such broad regulatory powers
to be exercised by an administrative board, or that the dangers in the
watchmaking business are not currently so much worse than in many
other businesses which the legislature has not regulated, so that
regulation of the watchmakers amounts to an arbitrary classification,
would have built a sounder frame of reference for the future guidance
of the state legislature.
It is fairly apparent that the Tennessee Supreme Court tends to
view the police power as limited generally to dangers to health and
property, though the language is sometimes broad enough to include
"private happiness." 40
The significance of physical or property danger is well shown in
38. Article 1, Section 8 is the quaint due process clause of the Tennessee
constitution: "That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his
freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment
of his peers of the law of the land." Article 11, Section 8 is the section dealing
with class legislation and is roughly equivalent to an "equal protection"

clause.
39. See Overton, Constitutional Law-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND. L.
REv. 1194, 1201 (1958) pointing out that the state courts generally tend to
give more freedom to businesses under state constitutions than the United
States Supreme Court does under the due process clause.
40. Phillips v. State, 304 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn. 1957) sustaining a statute requiring the observance of standard time only.
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another case, Hughes v. Board of Cornm'rs,41 sustaining the licensing
of electricians. The court pointed out the dangers of hazards created
by poor electrical work.42 The court sustained the classification involved, since the regulations did not apply to such work done for
electric-public service corporations or in operation of signals for
transmission of intelligence and in maintenance and repair of electrical equipment by the employees of a manufacturing concern. This
seems sound.
Dilworth v. State2 held a classification between public carriers
and contract carriers to be unconstitutional. Of course, there are
many situations in which a classification between common carriers and
private carriers is constitutionally important. For example, it is clear
that rates may be more fully regulated in the case of common carriers
than in the case of private contract carriers.
The classification attempted by the statute would, under the facts,
be unreasonable and discriminatory, however. The Public Acts of
19554 authorized counties, acting in conjunction with the county highway departments, to make regulations concerning the use of county
roads. These regulations were not to be applicable to passenger buses
or to common carriers authorized under certificates of convenience
and necessity issued by the state public service commission or by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, or to highways of the state
highway system, or to streets within the boundaries of incorporated
municipalities. Under this authority, Davidson County adopted certain weight regulations for county roads. The defendant was charged
with operating a truck in excess of the maximum weight upon a
by-pass around Nashville. The by-pass is widely used by common
carriers, as well as by contract carriers, and local haulers. Justice
Burnett, in writing the opinion of the court, pointed out that under
the state law, common carriers might have a maximum weight up
to 55,980 pounds,45 while the limits set by the Davidson County
regulations were 20,000 pounds. The unreasonableness of the distinction as applied to the particular road is entirely clear. Justice
41. 319 S.W.2d 481 (Tenn. 1959).

42. The opinion states: "All of us know that persons who do connect or

have anything to do with putting in various electrical fixtures and things of
that kind in the property, and especially in large urban areas, where there
are a lot of houses close together, that unless they know what they are doing,
the public is liable to be very much endangered. Houses can be burned up
and people electrocuted and various and sundry things of the kind that we
as a Court can and do take judicial knowledge of having happened when
these electrical gadgets or what-not are attempted to be fooled with by one
who lacks the necessary requisite knowledge to handle these electrical
things." 319 S.W.2d at 486.
43. 322 S.W.2d 219 (Tenn. 1959).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1113 to -1117 (1956).
45. TENN. CODE A.N. § 59-1109 (1956). Buses have a maximum weight of
42,000 pounds. TsNN. CODE ANN. § 59-1111 (1956).
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Burnett pointed out that there is no general rule by which to distinguish between reasonable and lawful classifications and unreasonable and arbitrary ones, but that the distinction was a practical one
depending upon the facts of each case.4 It is obvious, as the court
said, that a contract carrier does not, on a particular road, do more
damage than a common carrier of the same weight. The difference
between the weights that roads can carry depends upon the road
and not upon the nature of the carrier as a common or private one. The
solution to the problem arising from the difference in roads must lie
in a classification based upon that difference.
V.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

One decision squarely deals with administrative law problems.
Hughes v. Board of Comm'rs,47 has just been discussed as a case allowing a regulation of the electrical business. One of the interesting
problems was not discussed. The Code of the City of Chattanooga8
provides for a board of electrical examiners to examine and license
electricians. The court shows that the board used standard forms
prepared by "vocational guidance and educational professors of
Purdue University designed to test the knowledge of an electrical
contractor." 49 The court said that the board could make up such
rules and regulations as it sees fit, and that if there is no illegal and
arbitrary action in preparing the examinations, the courts could not
overrule the action of the board. This apparently authorizes large
discretion to administrative boards without violating the delegation
of legislative power principle. This in turn is further reflected in the
very liberal view that the court adopted in giving administrative
finality to administrative tribunals. The court said that it would not
interfere with actions of the board in deciding such questions as the
validity of the rules of the board relative to the examinations and
passing grades, unless
the determination is without or in excess of the statutory powers and
jurisdiction of the administrative authority, the determination is an
exercise of power so arbitrary or unreasonable as virtually to transcend
the authority conferred, or is otherwise an abuse of discretion, or is in
disregard of the fundamental rules of due process of law, as required by
constitutional or statutory directions, as where made without adequate
notice, fair hearing, and opportunity for the aggrieved party to present
46. The technique here should be compared with that involved in holding
the regulations of watchmakers invalid.
47. 319 S.W.2d 481 (Tenn. 1959).
48. This was authorized by Tenn. Priv. Acts 1933, ch. 572. Pursuant to this
authority the city enacted Chattanooga, Tenn., Code ch. 15 (1949).
49. 319 S.W.2d at 483.
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evidence, or in an otherwise irregular proceeding, or is tainted with
matters which disclose fraud, mistake, bad faith, corruption, or collusion,
or is based upon an error of law.50
Further quoting from the same source, the court said in the following language that it would not substitute its opinion for that of the
board:
[The court] must not substitute its judgment or notions of expediency
and fairness or wisdom for those which have guided such agency, even
where the proof is convincing that a different result would have been
better.51
These quotations and the decisions are in accord with modern
attitudes toward the finality of administrative determinations and the
scope of judicial review. It is hoped that this decision may be the
one that will clarify the previous inconsistencies, and the difficulties
which have in the past arisen in trying to resolve the conflicting
52
decisions on these questions in Tennessee.

VI. GOVERNMENTAL LAW
The cases herein discussed do not involve any common ground
except that they deal with the method of setting up governmental
agencies or the expenditures of governmental funds.
The one case decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee during the
period involved in the survey that probably more directly affects more
individuals, and more counties and municipalities than any other
53
decision for several years is State v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
holding that the Tennessee statute 54 authorizing the state to reimburse
utilities for the relocation of their facilities located on publicly owned
rights of way when necessary to construction of highways under the
interstate system of highways as provided by the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1956 is unconstitutional.
The court held5 that the act violated article 2, section 31, which
provides that the credit of the state should not be loaned or given in
aid of any person, association, company, corporation or municipality. 5
The court also mentioned article 2, section 29 of the Tennessee con50. This was quoted by the court from 42 AM. JuR. Pub. Administrative
Law § 209 at 611-17 (1942).
51. Id. at 621-22.
52. See Overton, supra note 39 at 1205-07.
53. 319 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. 1958).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 54-543 to -545 (Supp. 1958).
55. After a subsidiary holding that the Commissioner of Highways had
standing to institute suit attacking the constitutionality of the act. 319 S.W.2d
at 92-94.
56. Other clauses prevent the state from becoming the owner of a bank, or
a stockholder with others in any association, company, corporation, or
municipality.
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stitution which apparently permits the General Assembly to authorize
municipal corporations to lend or give their credit to private persons
and purposes, if authorized by a referendum. The court said- that this
57
section is permissive, while section 31 is prohibitory
It seems that what the court objects to is not so much a lending of
the state's credit,5 but rather the basic idea that the money of the
state cannot be spent in what amounts to a donation. Citing an earlier
case, 9 the court said: "The obvious purpose of this Section of our
Constitution was to prevent the State from using its credit as a
'60
gratuity or donation to any person, corporation, or municipality.
The gist of the opinion is simply that the primary purpose was for
the benefit of the utilities and hence the purpose cannot be public.
The court said that the statute involved "is primarily for the benefit
of subscribers of utilities or their stockholders, and is neither a State
nor a public purpose."61 It seems obvious that the court was swayed
by its understanding that the relocation of facilities would cost over
2
$15 million out of the $30 million bond issue authorized.
There was a dissenting opinion6 3 which concluded that this was a
public purpose and which pointed out that since the federal government would refund ninety per cent of the costs the amount of bond
funds diverted for relocation expenses would be but ten per cent of
the figures used by the majority. The dissent also pointed out that
the so-called benefit to the utilities was a repayment of a "non-betterment cost." That is, the dissent concluded that this was not a gift,
but simply prevented the relocation from causing damage.
The majority and the dissent differed on every question. They dis64
agreed as to the interpretation of a Kentucky case. They disagreed
on the application of previous decisions. The majority construed a
57. 319 S.W.2d at 93.
58. Some states make a distinction apparently between lending the state's

credit and appropriating money already in the treasury. Craig v. North
Mississippi Community Hosp., 206 Miss. 11, 39 So. 2d 523 (1949).

59. Bedford County Hosp. v. Browning, 189 Tenn. 227, 225 S.W.2d 41 (1949).

Annot., 161 A.L.R. 518 (1946) points out that under many state constitutions a

state, or more properly "a municipal corporation cannot use its funds, exert its
taxing powers, or loan its credit to promote a private enterprise," quoting
38 AM. Jua. Municipal Corporation§§ 401-02 (1941).
60. 189 Tenn. at 232, 225 S.W.2d at 43. The quotation continued, however,
with the statement that it was obvious that it was not intended to prevent
the state from aiding persons if' required to accomplish a state or public
purpose, or to fulfill a state duty or obligation under its police power.
61. 319 S.W.2d at 92.
62. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, ch. 264.
63. In the original opinion, Justice Tomlinson dissented. Chief Justice Neil
did not participate. On a rehearing the Chief Justice dissented also. 319
S.W.2d at 94-102.
64. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.2d 308 (Ky.
1954). The majority said it held that relocation of facilities was not a public
purpose. The dissent said that it dealt with a grant and not a statute authorizing the expenditure of public funds. 319 S.W.2d at 93-102.
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previous case65 as holding expenditures for public and private nonprofit hospitals to be a public purpose only because this was the
performance of public duties "with no right to reap individual profit"
and that the state, though it would not own the properties, "would
continue to have the use of the hospitals for the people of the entire
state," and that the hospitals would be "under State control, regulation and supervision." The dissent said that a majority of cases in
other states had adjudged such use of public funds to be a public
67
purpose 66 and that a previous case in Tennessee showed this was so.
The dissent, in concluding its argument, pointed out that the utility
customers through their federal gasoline taxes will pay a proportionate share of the cost of relocation in other states and as a consequence
of this decision will pay the total cost of relocation in Tennessee. An
opinion concurring with the majority concluded with the idea that
if this legislation is upheld, there is no way to stop the legislature
"whenever it may decide to do equity according to its own conception."6 8
It is submitted that the opinion of the court did not give enough
weight to the fact that this is an expense of building roads and should
not fall on individual companies any more than the damage done by
raising or lowering the grade of a road adjacent to private property.
However, to the extent that the utilities have a mere permissive use,
the rule of eminent domain might be different. It is believed that the
opinion failed to recognize that its reference to the consumers of
public utilities constitutes almost the entire population of the state
and that their benefit constitutes a "public purpose." Further, it
would appear that the court overlooked the fact that the state can or
does regulate, control and supervise public utilities about as fully
as it can anything and about as fully as it could the hospitals in the
Bedford County Hospital case. 69 If, as the dissent believed, public
utilities may in many instances face bankruptcy, the public interest
is obvious.
65. Bedford County Hosp. v. Browning, supra note 59.
66. Opinion of the Justices, 132 A.2d 613 (N.H. 1957); Opinion of the
Justices, 152 Me. 449, 132 A.2d 440 (1957); Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman,
91 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1958).
67. Nichol v. Mayor of Nashville, 28 Tenn.,(9 Humph.) 252 (1848). This case
sustained a subscription to a railroad as a public purpose. The dissent also
said that it had been held that issuance of bonds to a luggage factory had
been a public purpose. 319 S.W.2d at 96, citing McConnell v. City of Lebanon,
314 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1958). The dissent could also have cited another recent
case sustaining an agreement by a county to build an industrial plant and
lease it to an industrial concern. Darnell v. County of Montgomery, 308 S.W.2d
373 (Tenn. 1957).

68. 319 S.W.2d at 95. This is a familiar but questionable argument. See
note 39 supraand the text to which it refers.
69. Supra note 59.
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It is believed that certain groups which originally opposed the
payment to the utilities of the relocation costs have suffered a change
of heart now that it is realized that, at least, increased rates will
have to be charged by certain utilities.
The final case to be treated in this survey lacks the urgency of the
case last discussed. State ex rel. Johnson v. Davis, - held briefly that
the Clarksville city court was not a "constitutional" court and hence
that the judge could be appointed and need not be elected under
article 6, sections 1 and 4, of the Tennessee constitution. The opinion
distinguished the city court from the juvenile and domestic relations
court of Nashville, which was held to be a "constitutional" court
in a previous case 1 since it exercised some powers concurrently with
the circuit, criminal and chancery courts. A previous case2 involving
the corporation court of Elizabethton was held controlling. This case
was also decided during the period covered by this survey.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is believed that the Tennessee Supreme Court achieved during
the year, somewhat better than last,7 3 the establishment of a frame of
reference for the guidance of legislature, attorneys and litigants; but
it is respectfully submitted that even more improvement would be
of value to the State of Tennessee.
70. 322 S.W.2d 214 (Tenn. 1959).
71. Haywood v. Superintendent, Davidson County Workhouse, 195 Tenn.
265, 259 S.W.2d 159 (1953).
72. City of Elizabethton v. Carter County, 321 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1959)

holding that a legislative act providing for a General Sessions Court for
Carter County had not repealed a private act amending the Charter of the
City of Elizabethton.
73. Overton, supra note 39 at 1194.

